Introduction
My main interests lay in the intersection between philosophy and law, in particular international law. In my dissertation, I start from the claim that any attempt at a theory of international justice which ignores the role of the institution of international law is flawed. This is, I argue, because justice of a particular action in the international sphere depends, in part, on the necessary features of the institutions of the international community. With this in mind, I provide a comprehensive, normative analysis of the institution of international law. As an analogy, to both my motivation and my content, consider the claim that what counts as a just distribution of state funds among university departments is partially determined by the institutional features of the university. Studying the institution of higher education and providing a normative analysis of it, as in, answering the questions of what goals ought a university pursue and how best to do it, can help us in determining how to distribute state funds justly. So, if we can show that providing education is a necessary condition for something to count as a university, then this informs, to some extent, what counts as just in distributing state funds. Simply put, in instances where there is an interaction between institutions and individuals, what counts as just is obviously determined (in part) by the necessary features of that institution. My goal is then to help determine what counts as just in the international arena, by examining the necessary features of the institution of international law, including, its goals, as well as other conditions it must meet to be a legitimate institution.